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Abstract 
The financial system plays a major role in the transition to a low-carbon economy. We 
investigate this issue analyzing the recent developments and challenges in the bond and 
debt markets. First, we study the pricing of green bonds at issuance. We find a premium 
when green bonds are issued by supranational institutions and corporates while there is 
no effect for financial institutions. We also document an effect for external review and 
repeated access to this market. Second, we investigate lending decisions by banks issuing 
green bonds. Our results show that these lenders reduce their funding towards more 
polluting segments of the economy but limited to the amount of loans they granted as 
lead bank in the deal. This evidence may explain why we do not find a green premium for 
financial issuers. Yet it also suggests that the banking system may play a much larger role 
in channeling funds towards low-carbon activities, and thus reducing the environmental 
risks also for the financial system. 
 Introduction 
The traditional public intervention to correct externalities, notably, in the form of taxes, 
subsidies and regulation, seems largely insufficient to address the current environmental 
and climate-related challenges. The sheer magnitude of these problems requires 
mobilizing a considerable amount of funds. In this area, finance has undoubtedly a key 
role to play. Among the activities and instruments of sustainable finance, green bonds 
represent one of the most promising market-based solutions to channel funds to 
environmentally beneficial projects, as well as to raise awareness of environmental risks. 
Green bonds are fixed income securities which usually differ from conventional debt 
instruments only in that they finance environmental or climate-related projects. While 
volumes in the green bond market have increased rapidly since its inception in 2007, to 
roughly 20 billion EUR in 2014 and 93 billion in 2018, the market growth potential remains 
enormous. In this respect, transparency and disclosure are fundamental to align investors’ 
incentives.  
It has been stressed that non-pecuniary motives, specifically pro-environmental 
preferences, motivate investors to hold green assets. If the appetite for certain types of 
assets enters the utility function of a group of investors in addition to their expectations 
regarding return and risk, investors’ tastes modify equilibrium prices (Fama and French, 
2007). A major issue for green-minded investors is to be able to disentangle a genuine 
commitment on the part of the issuer to use the proceeds in an environmentally friendly 
way from mere ‘greenwashing’. This is all the more important in the absence of a 
universally accepted definition of green, or, put differently, in the presence of ‘many 
shades of green’, as it is the case now. The greenness of the bond, and thus of the 
underlying project it provides funding for, might be particularly difficult to signal for 
financial institutions. Laying out the use of proceeds and the global environmental strategy 
behind the issuance of a green bond allows one to identify specific investment projects in 
the case of non-financial companies. For financial institutions, resorting to the green debt 
market often involves engaging also in green lending, instead of investing directly in 
environmental-friendly projects. In all cases, the disclosure and reporting requirements 
associated with the issuance of green bonds entail additional costs for the borrowers, which 
could be compensated by the ‘greenium’, i.e. the market premium to the price of the bond.  
In this paper, we investigate the pricing implications of the green label on the primary 
market for bond issuances. Using a large sample of bonds issued worldwide from 2007 to 
2018, we investigate the determinants of the yield of new bond issuances. Our 
identification strategy relies on comparing bonds that are similar with respect to a number 
of relevant features, except for the green label. We find that green bonds are not always 
issued at a premium compared to ordinary bonds, but with some  heterogeneous pattern 
across different issuers. Specifically, we find a premium for green bonds issued by 
supranational institutions and corporates, while there is no effect for financial issuers. This 
evidence is confirmed by the findings in the battery of tests that we run to gain further 
insights regarding the main determinants of bond yields in the green market. First, we 
test the impact of certification – a market-based solution to reduce information 
asymmetries between borrowers and investors based on third-party evaluation of the 
compliance with some green bond principles. Second, we test whether green bonds issued 
by repeat issuers are priced differently than those issued by one-time issuers in the green 
market. Indeed, we find that repeat issuers benefit from an additional premium. We 
 interpret this as evidence of a reputation effect on the green bond market, at least for 
non-financial corporates. In the second part of the analysis, we focus on financial 
institutions and make an attempt to explain the reasons behind the absence of a 
‘greenium’ for financial issuers. We find that institutions that have declared a clear 
commitment to environmental principles (i.e. those subscribing the United Nations 
Environment Programme Financial Initiative) issued green bonds at a premium.  
We then explore the lending decisions of banks after green bond issuances. To this end, 
we match syndicated loans data with the bond issuance data. Using information on the 
sector-country pollution intensity – approximated by the greenhouse gas emissions –, we 
are able to identify whether lending is redirected towards less polluting activities following 
a green bond issuance. Our results show that lead banks having issued a green bond 
reduce their exposure towards more polluting activities. Taken together, our results 
suggest that the green bond label per se is not enough to raise funding at a lower cost. 
This is most likely due to the difficulties for the investors to disentangle issuers with a 
genuine commitment to environmentally friendly projects from mere ‘greenwashing’. 
Indeed, it might be more difficult for some issuers to credibly signal to the market their 
engagement towards green activities.   
Our analysis has a number of policy implications. While the size of the green bond market 
relative to the whole bond market is still tiny, our findings on the ‘greenium’ suggest the 
presence of a market incentive for some categories of green bond issuers. It is not clear 
whether and to what extent the ‘greenium’ is able to compensate borrowers for the 
additional costs associated with obtaining the green label, and can de facto contribute to 
the development of the green bond market, though. Policy intervention is deemed 
necessary in order to set up adequate incentives for both the demand and the supply side, 
and thus ultimately enhance the market of green securities. The role of the financial 
system is pivotal in this.  
Financial institutions are the most active players on the green bond market, based on 
amount issued so far. Our analysis suggests that activity on the green debt market is an 
indication of a broader environmental strategy whereby banks reduce lending to more 
polluting sectors. Thus, both sides of banks’ balance sheets, to certain extent, are 
becoming greener. Ultimately, this implies a changed risk profile of banks’ balance sheets, 
particularly through the direct exposure to environmental and climate-related risks. At 
micro level, this translate into a lower risk profile in term of direct exposures to 
environmental and climate-related risks. Moreover, it may also limit negative spillover 
effects on the overall financial system (see e.g. Battiston et al., 2017). However, an 
assessment of whether financial institutions are becoming greener at the appropriate pace 
strictly depends on the prospective scenario one has in mind, notably for the evolution of 
environmental and climate challenges. Climate change is well recognized as a major 
challenge to financial stability and the global economy in international fora, such as G20 
and the Financial Stability Board. Accordingly, academics and practitioners increasingly 
advocate regulatory changes that account for these risks, particularly lower capital risk 
requirements for green assets that can reduce environmental risks. In practice, current 
micro-prudential rules do not contemplate a role for strictly non-financial risks. However, 
some central banks and regulators, particularly in emerging markets, are considering the 
inclusion of an assessment of banks’ exposure to green lending in their supervisory 
framework. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After the review of related literature in 
Section 1, Section 2 gives an institutional overview and a descriptive analysis of the green 
bond market, with a focus on non-governmental issuers. Section 3 describes the data we 
use in the pricing analysis. Section 4 introduces our econometric methodology, while 
Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 presents the empirical analysis on financial green 
bond issuers and green lending. Finally, Section 7 offers some conclusions and 
implications, also for financial stability. 
1. Related literature  
This paper relates to different strands of the financial literature that consider 
environmental aspects. A line of research related to this work investigates the 
environmental profile of a firm in relation to the cost of funding (see, e.g. Sharfman and 
Fernando, 2008; Chava, 2014). Lower cost of capital has been documented for firms with 
better environmental risk management indicators (Sharfman and Fernando, 2008) and 
higher environmental performance, measured by the environmental component of the 
corporate social responsibility (Ghoul et al., 2011).1 Similarly Chava (2014) finds that 
investors expect higher returns from stocks of firms with environmental concerns. These 
evidence may be driven by specific investors preferences (Riedl and Smeets, 2017; 
Hartzmark and Sussman, 2018; Barber et al., 2018). Environmental risks are priced not 
only by investors, but also by lenders. Investigating the price and the structure of 
syndicated loans, Chava (2014)  shows that firms with environmental concerns are 
charged a higher loan spread and receive loans granted by syndicates with fewer banks. 
Yet, he does not find a positive effect for environmental strengths.  
Recently, few papers examine the pricing of green bonds, finding contrasting evidence. In 
the secondary market, Hachenberg and Schiereck (2018) do not find compelling evidence 
that green bonds are priced in a significantly different way compared to similar ordinary 
bonds. Using a matching procedure, Zerbib (2018) finds instead a moderate green bond 
premium with respect to a counterfactual ordinary bond in a sample that includes 110 
large, investment grade green bonds of many categories and currencies. Focusing on a 
large sample of US municipalities, Karpf and Mandel (2017) document a green bond 
discount on secondary market yields. After factoring in tax considerations, Baker et al. 
(2018) find the opposite result in the primary market, notably that green municipal bonds 
are issued at a premium to otherwise similar ordinary bonds. Using a sample of 640 
matched pairs of green and non-green bonds issued on the same day by the same 
municipality, and with identical maturating and rating, Larcker and Watts (2019) don’t find 
evidence of a premium. The effects of green bond issuance have been further investigated 
in Tang and Zhang (2018) and Flammer (2018). Tang and Zhang (2018) find a positive 
stock market reaction and also a greater stock liquidity following green bond issuance. 
Besides confirming a positive stock market return, Flammer (2018) also shows that both 
operating performance and environmental performance improve after a green bond 
issuance. We contribute to this literature investigating the pricing implications of the green 
                                           
1 The literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) is well developed and provide useful insights. Ge and Liu 
(2015) find that better CSR index is associated with lower cost of new issued bonds. Goss and Roberts 
(2011) show that CSR has an impact, even though moderate, also on the interest rate of syndicated loans. 
However environmental related aspects are only one dimension between those considered in CSR 
performance, which includes, for example, employees relations, human rights and product characteristics.     
 label on the primary market at issuance for a worldwide sample of bonds, including 
supranational, financial and non-financial issuers.  
Another strand of literature recognizes that some firms are particularly exposed to liability 
risks including litigation, new technology, and regulation (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; 
Gormeley and Matsa, 2011). This applies as well to firms facing environmental and climate 
risks which may end up facing larger environmental liabilities and higher risk of 
bankruptcy.2 Chang et al. (2018) quantify environment liabilities and find that they have 
implications for firms’ capital structure. Similarly, Ginglinger and Moreau (2019) show that 
physical climate risks are associated with lower leverage. Environmental risks might be an 
important threat also for the banking sector. Klomp (2014) shows empirically that natural 
disasters increase the likelihood of banks’ default. However, Delis et al. (2018) document 
that banks charge higher loan rates to fossil fuel firms, which are more exposed to climate 
risk, only after 2015. With respect to these works, we provide some insights regarding the 
lending decision of banks that have issued green bonds and complement previous findings 
on corporate capital structure. 
2. Green bonds  
2.1. Institutional background  
Green bonds are intended to encourage sustainable activities by financing climate-
related or environmentally friendly projects. As a relatively new practice in finance, 
there is no commonly accepted definition of a green bond yet. In practice, some 
guidance in identifying green bonds is provided by the Green Bond Principles (GBP), 
voluntary process guidelines put forward by the International Capital Market 
Association (ICMA).3 Specifically, this standardized procedure encourages 
transparency and disclosure by focusing on four main areas, namely the use of 
proceeds, the process for project evaluation and selection, the management of 
proceeds, and reporting. Currently, the labeling of a bond as ‘green’, while reflecting 
the broad correspondence with the GBP, de facto could be more or less loosely applied 
by the traditional providers of financial markets data, such as Bloomberg or DCM.  
The absence of a commonly agreed definition, as well as of a unique reference 
framework, has been identified by the European Commission as one of the barriers to 
the development of the green bond market. In its final report, the EU High-Level Group 
on Sustainable Finance (EU HLEG, 2018) made several recommendations to promote 
the development of the green bond market. In particular, as a first step, ‘the EU should 
introduce an official EU Green Bond Standard (EU GBS) and consider an EU Green Bond 
label or certificate to help the market to develop fully and to maximize its capacity to 
finance green projects that contribute to wider sustainability objectives.’ The 
formulation of an explicit definition of green bonds based on a common ‘sustainability 
taxonomy’ advocated by the EU HLEG would ideally address the uncertainties and areas 
of concern that may require greater prescription than what is provided by the current 
voluntary standards. At the same time, it would incorporate the existing best market 
practice.  
                                           
2 Li et al. (2014) find that higher audit fees are charged to firms exposed to higher environmental risks due to 
the more demanding procedures that auditors have to implement. 
3 https://www.icmagroup.org/green-social-and-sustainability-bonds/green-bond-principles-gbp/ 
 Since the primary objective of the standard is to help raise investment in green projects 
and activities, transparency is a crucial issue to mitigate information asymmetries on 
the actual environmental sustainability of the projects financed by the debt issuance. 
In practice, several organizations have started to provide green labels that indicate 
conformity to particular definitions of green. In this way, they align the incentives of 
potential investors who value the sustainability aspects of the financial instruments, 
and those of the issuers. While certification and external review undoubtedly increase 
transparency and provide a reputational benefit to the issuers, they come at a cost. 
Whether and to what extent the market prizes this additional financial effort by issuers 
become then relevant questions to answer in the light of the need of promoting the 
development of the green bond market. Inspired by Baker et al. (2018), in our 
empirical exercise we check if external review, in the form of second party opinion or 
certification, has a significant impact on the pricing of green bonds on the primary 
market.4  
2.2. The green bond market  
Since the first green bond issuance in 2007, the market for green bonds has been 
increasing steadfastly, as Figure 1 shows. The blue bars represent the total value of 
green bonds, while the red line displays the number of green bonds issued each year 
from 2007. The value of issuances reached a peak of 93 billion Euros in 2018, with 565 
green bonds issued. In relative terms, the market is still quite small in size compared 
the market for conventional bonds (around 2.42% in 2018).  
 
--------------------INSERT FIGURE 1 ---------------------------------- 
 
Figure 2 depicts the breakdown by issuer type for green bonds issued between January 
2007 and December 2018. The financial sector accounts for almost half of the total 
amounts issued (46.30%), while non-financial corporations for another 40%. The rest 
is issued by international organizations and supranational institutions. Considering 
non-financial issuers only, utility and energy companies have the lion’s share in the 
market in terms of both number and value of contracts (almost 60 billion Euro and 289 
deals cumulated over the period 2007-2018). This is not surprising given the direct 
impact of these sectors on climate change and the environment. Companies operating 
in the transportation and real estate sectors are also very active on the market, 
reaching a cumulative value of 28 billion Euro of borrowed amount. In terms of contract 
duration, the data shows a prevalence of short (0-5 years) and medium (5-10 years) 
term maturities, which combined account roughly for 75% percent of the market value, 
roughly equally split. The rest of the market comprises long-term contracts with a 
maturity of more than 20 years.  
 
                                           
4 External review is a common term that covers a wide spectrum of services from environmental consultancy to 
audits on use of proceeds. For our purposes, we can include two different types of external review: i) second 
party opinion; ii) certification. For the latter, we rely on the certification procedure provided by the Climate 
Bond Initiative (CBI). The CBI's Climate Bonds Standard establishes sector-specific eligibility criteria to judge 
an asset's low carbon value and suitability for issuance as a green bond. Assets that meet the CBI standard 
are then eligible for Climate Bond Certification, after an approved external verification that the bond meets 
environmental standards and that the issuer has the proper controls and processes in place. 
 --------------------INSERT FIGURE 2 ---------------------------------- 
 
 
3. Data and summary statistics 
Our main data source is Dealogic DCM, which covers data about bond primary markets 
worldwide (see e.g. Hale and Spiegel, 2012). DCM provides detailed bond issue 
characteristics at the tranche level, alongside information about the issuer. We select 
all bond tranches issued by financial and non-financial companies, as well as 
supranational institutions in the period 2007-2018.5 We also have qualitative 
information on the features of the bonds, such as the nature of the project for which 
the proceeds are used, the reporting, and the name of the external reviewer. Based 
on the description of the underlying project, DCM allows a classification of the 
instrument type, notably whether it is a conventional or a green bond. We identify 
1,397 green bonds out of 271,312 fixed income securities.6  
Table 1 shows that the majority of green bond issuances has been made by the 
corporate sector, with financial corporations having issued the largest cumulative 
amount so far. This is partially explained by the strong reliance of financial firms on 
the bond market, on aggregate, compared to the non-financial firms. Looking at the 
yields, it is apparent that, on average, green bonds have a lower yield at issuance than 
ordinary bonds issued by the same type of borrowers. Exploiting the qualitative 
information on external review, we identify a total of 637 bonds that have obtained a 
second party opinion or are certified by the Climate Bond Initiative (CBI). Interestingly, 
non-financial firms are more frequently resorting to certification. Table 1 shows that 
bonds with external review have average lower yields than self-labelled green bonds 
without review. This is particularly true for financial firms and non-financial firms.  
 
--------------------INSERT TABLE 1---------------------------------- 
4. Econometric strategy  
To investigate the pricing implications of the green label we use a standard equation 
for bond yields, as implemented in previous studies (Gu et al., 2017, Gozzi et al., 
2015). In particular, we follow Baker et al. (2018) who develop a model of asset pricing 
with a non-pecuniary clientele in the spirit of Fama and French (2007). In this setup, 
pro-environment tastes can be accommodated in a straightforward way. Specifically, 
our econometric model is as follows:  
   
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑿𝑿𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1) 
 
                                           
5 While also government bodies issue green bond we limit our analysis to financial and non-financial corporations. 
See Baker et al. (2018) for a study on bond issued by U.S. municipalities.  
6 An alternative database commonly used in the literature is Bloomberg, which also reports green bonds. The 
Bloomberg dataset includes a similar number of green bonds, but we prefer the DCM dataset due to the 
better coverage of the main bond characteristics.  
 where 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 refers to the yield at issuance of bond b issued by firm i in time t.  𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is our main variable of interest, which equals one if a bond is green, and zero 
otherwise. X includes a set of bond characteristics that may affect the yield. 
Specifically, we control for callable, a dummy variable which is equal one if a bond is 
callable, zero otherwise; puttable a dummy variable which is equal one if a bond is 
puttable, zero otherwise; and collateralized a dummy variable which is equal one if a 
bond has some underlined collateral, zero otherwise. Furthermore, we control for the 
currency of issuance and the purpose of a bond, through the variable use of proceeds, 
distinguishing between general corporate purposes, securitization, refinancing, and 
any other use. We create decile categories both for the size of the tranche and the 
total amount borrowed by the issuer on that day. Maturity is a categorical variable that 
distinguishes among short-term (less than five years), medium-term (between five 
and ten years) and long-term (more than ten years) bonds. We also consider the bond 
rating, as provided by S&P, Moody’s or Fitch, and define eleven categories with 1 
assigned to the top rating and 11 to the worst rating (or not rated). Further, time fixed 
effects are introduced to capture global time-varying unobservable factors that might 
affect the primary bond market in a specific month. We adopt a conservative approach 
and include the interaction fixed effect maturity×rating×time to account for twists in 
the yield curve. We control for time-invariant unobservable firm-specific characteristics 
using an issuer fixed effect, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖. Finally, 𝜖𝜖𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the error term.7 Table 2 reports the 
summary statistics for the variables used in the bond pricing analysis.  
 
--------------------INSERT TABLE 2---------------------------------- 
5. Results  
5.1. Main results  
Table 3 reports our baseline results. Column (1) displays the results for the full sample 
comprising all categories of borrowers. The coefficient of the variable of interest is 
negative, suggesting that green bonds sell for a moderate premium over ordinary 
bonds. However, the effect is not identified with precision in the full sample. This might 
be due to the heterogeneity in the way different types of issuers – particularly financial 
and non-financial borrowers – access the bond market, and are ultimately evaluated 
by investors. We account for such heterogeneity by running separate regressions for 
the different categories of issuers in our sample, namely supranational institutions, 
financial and non-financial corporations. The results are reported in columns (2)-(4) of 
Table 3. The coefficient estimates vary significantly across issuer types. First, we find 
that only green bonds issued by supranational institutions (column (2) of Table 3) and 
non-financial corporations (column (4)) sell for a premium compared to ordinary 
bonds. While statistically significant, the yield gap for supranational institutions (80 
basis points) is almost four times larger in magnitude than that for non-financial 
corporations. By contrast, we do not find a statistically significant yield difference for 
green bonds issued by financial institutions (column (3) of Table 3). Thus, the 
‘greenium’ does not seem to be there for all categories of issuers. One possible reason 
                                           
7 According to Petersen (2009), OLS estimates in panel data can be biased because of residuals correlations. We 
use cluster standard error at the issuer level. 
 is that while non-financial companies may signal the greenness of the projects for 
which the bond proceeds are used in a more transparent way, this may be more difficult 
for financial institutions. Indeed, if investors have preferences for green products, 
asymmetric information on the greenness of the underlying projects is crucial for 
preferences to affect market prices.8   
 
--------------------INSERT TABLE 3 ---------------------------------- 
 
We shed light on this issue in two alternative ways. First, we test whether external 
review has an impact on the offering yield. If external review acts as a signaling device 
for bonds that actually have environmental or climate-related benefits, we expect 
certified bonds to sell for a premium compared not only to conventional bonds but also 
to non- green securities. Operationally, we augment the baseline model with a dummy 
variable (External review) that takes the value of one for green bonds that are CBI-
certified or have obtained a second party opinion, and zero for self-labelled green 
securities. Table 4 reports the results for the full sample and for the sub-samples for 
homogeneous issuer types. The review dummy does not affect the average bond yield 
in the full sample (column (1)). The sample splitting exercise sheds light on the drivers 
of these findings. First, due to lack of observations, we are not able to identify the 
effect of external review on the issues of supranational institutions (column (2)). 
Second, we find again a marked difference between financial and non-financial 
corporate bonds. The coefficient of the review dummy is not significantly different from 
zero for financial green bonds (column (3). By contrast, as expected, it is negative for 
bonds issued by non-financial corporations (column (4)), where it is statistically 
significant al 5%. At almost 70 basis points, the estimated impact of certification is 
sizable, particularly if compared with the effect of the self-reported green label (17 
bps). Interestingly, this latter is not estimated with precision in the augmented model.  
Alternatively, we consider repeated debt issues on the green bond market as a way to 
provide information benefits to investors. Accordingly, we augment our baseline model 
with the dummy variable Experienced green, which is equal one if the issuer has 
already placed a green bond, and zero otherwise. If multiple green bond issuances give 
investors an increasing engagement with borrowers’ business, then we would expect 
returning issuers to benefit from a correspondingly larger ‘greenium’ than first-time 
bond sellers. The results of the augmented model are reported in Table 5. In the full 
sample, the coefficient of the dummy for returning issuers is negative and statistically 
significant at 10% (see column (1)). The magnitude of the effect is around 44 bps. 
Again, the breakdown by issuer categories reveals some heterogeneity in the effects 
of greenness. In particular, supranational and financial institutions that have already 
resorted to the green bond market do not benefit from a ‘greenium’ on their 
subsequent issuances (see columns (2) and (3)). By contrast, this is the case for non-
financial corporations (column (4)). The negative yield gap with respect to one-time 
issuers is around 35 bps. One explanation could be that issuers placing more than one 
green bond are able to better signal their greenness over time. The build-up of a 
reputation and/or a better ability to screen borrowers on the part of investors might 
                                           
8 Riedl and Smeets (2017) show that individual investors are willing to give up financial performance in order to invest 
in accordance with their preferences. They investigate social responsible investments but it is likely that these results may apply as well 
to green products following the increasing concerns for global warming.  
 indeed explain the premium we find in favor of returning non-financial issuers. From 
the borrowers’ perspective, the premium associated with multiple issuances might be 
justified by the additional disclosure costs that returning to the green bond market 
entail for borrowers. 
 
--------------------INSERT TABLE 4 ---------------------------------- 
 
--------------------INSERT TABLE 5 ---------------------------------- 
5.2. Robustness analysis 
In this section we provide a battery of robustness tests for our baseline regression 
model in equation (1). A first set of results is reported in Table 6. In panel A, we 
investigate whether the country of the issuer matters for the existence and the 
magnitude of the ‘greenium’, ceteris paribus. In particular, we distinguish between 
emerging and developed countries, for the full sample of all borrowers as well as for 
the sub-samples of homogeneous issuer types. All in all, the estimates suggest that 
the results of the baseline model are mainly driven by supranational and non-financial 
issuers located in developed economies.9 In Panel B of Table 6 we check the effect of 
the currency denomination on the offering yield of the bond. Previous literature has 
found that bonds denominated in local currency tend to have a tighter credit spread 
because they hold a lower exchange risk than bonds issued in foreign currencies, 
ceteris paribus (Ehlers and Packer, 2017; Nanayakkara and Colombage, 2018). To test 
for this, we create a dummy variable (labeled Local) equal to one if the bond is 
denominated in local currency, and zero otherwise. While the effects of the local 
currency dummy are borderline statistically significant only in the full sample with all 
issuers, the results for the green label are not quantitatively different from those in 
the baseline model in Table 3.  
As a further robustness check, we adopt a different definition of the dependent 
variable. So far, our left hand variable has been the offering yield of the bond in the 
primary market. Such yield reflects the risk premium that issuers pay to investors to 
raise funds. Following previous studies (Jang, 2008; Ge and Liu, 2015; Shi, 2003; 
Wang and Zhang, 2009), we alternatively measure the dependent variable as the 
difference between the bond yield at issuance and a sovereign bond yield with 
comparable maturity, issued in the same country as our reference security.10 This 
allows us to filter the bond credit risk from the associated sovereign risk. In other 
words, the yield spread is a direct and accurate measure of issuers’ incremental cost 
of a bond over a comparable risk-free government bond. In addition, by taking the 
difference between the returns, we also control for the effect of economy-wide 
information. Constrained by the thickness of sovereign bonds markets, we perform this 
robustness analysis only for OECD countries. Overall, we cover 70% of our initial 
sample of bond issuances. The first two columns in Table 7 report the results. For the 
sake of comparison, columns (3) and (4) display the estimates of the baseline model 
                                           
9 We do not need to control for country fixed effects (or industry fixed effects) as there are absorbed by 
specification the issuer fixed effects that we include in our baseline specification.  
10 We match our sample with the sovereign bonds dataset downloaded by Dealogic DCM. We used the propensity 
score matching algorithm to find comparable Treasury bonds. Once selected the country of the issuer we 
define the set of associated sovereign bonds and successively we run the algorithm in order to find the closer 
sovereign bonds, computing the distance based on Issuance date and time to maturity. 
 with the offering yield as the dependent variable on the sub-sample of issuers located 
in OECD countries. The results for the yield spread are in line with those for the baseline 
model. In particular, we find a non-negligible and statistically significant green bond 
premium in favor of non-financial corporate issues compared to conventional bonds.  
 
--------------------INSERT TABLE 6 ---------------------------------- 
 
--------------------INSERT TABLE 7 ---------------------------------- 
 
5.3. Green bonds and financial institutions  
The analysis in the previous sections suggests that there are significant differences in 
how the market prizes the green label across types of issuer. In particular, while we 
find a significant ‘greenium’ for non-financial corporations, there is no evidence of a 
similar price advantage for green bonds issued by financial institutions, ceteris paribus. 
This might stem from the very nature of the type of business. Non-financial 
corporations normally issue green bonds to finance environmental or climate-related 
projects. As such, they can easily detail the activities that the bond proceeds are 
earmarked to finance, and further commit to report details during the lifetime of the 
bond. While the link with green projects is immediate for non-financial corporations, 
this is not necessarily the case for financial institutions, whose alignment with 
environmental/climate principles might be more difficult to signal to the market. 
Alternatively, activity on the green bond market might be motivated by the 
informational advantage that can be obtained therein and used in future underwriting 
procedures. In general, mitigation the information asymmetry on the use of funds to 
rule out greenwashing might be more difficult for financial issuers. As an indirect way 
to test for the importance of signaling greenness, we consider membership in the 
United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) as a proxy for 
banks’ attitude toward environmental and climate change issues. The United Nations 
Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) is a global partnership between 
the United Nations and the financial sector, established with the aim to encourage the 
better implementation of sustainability principles at all levels of operations in financial 
institutions.11 We define a dummy variable (labelled Environmentally friendly) taking 
the value one from the year onward in which a bank signed the initiative, and zero 
otherwise. Then, we augment our baseline specification with this variable dummy and 
its interaction with the dummy Green. Provided membership in the UNEP FI correctly 
signals a business strategy aligned with environmental objectives, we expect a 
negative coefficient for the interaction term. The results are reported in Table 8. 
Indeed, we find that green bonds issued by financial institutions affiliated to the UNEP 
FI benefit from a price advantage compared to financial issuers that have not 
subscribed to it.  
 
--------------------INSERT TABLE 8 ---------------------------------- 
                                           
11 Over 200 members (banks, insurers, and fund managers) have joined the initiative. Data are taken from 
http://www.unepfi.org/members/ 
  
6. Financial issuers and green lending  
The analysis on green bond pricing has documented that, while a significant amount 
of green bonds are issued by financial institutions, there is no evidence of a pricing 
advantage of financial green bonds compared to ordinary bonds, ceteris paribus. We 
contend that this might be due to the inherent difficulties of linking directly the 
proceeds of the bond with specific green projects. Likely, the link is only indirect 
whenever the green bond funding finds a correspondence in a green portfolio on the 
asset side of banks’ balance sheets. In theory, green lending itself could act as a signal 
of commitment to environmental-friendly activities, and thus translate in a pricing 
premium in the presence of strong enough pro-environmental preferences on the 
demand side. In this section, we investigate the lending behavior of financial 
institutions that have been issuers on the green bond market. Specifically, we test 
whether those financial institutions shift their lending towards less polluting activities 
after issuing a green bond. To this end, we combine the data on green bond issuances 
with loan-level data from syndicated loans and aggregate data on sectoral pollution 
intensity. In an ideal setting, we would like to observe the projects that are financed 
by each loan, and eventually to associate the funding raised with the green bonds to 
the corresponding green loan on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. Unfortunately, 
we face significant data constraints. First, we do not have data at the project level to 
precisely trace the use of funds. Second, while some information on green loans is 
currently available, the data is scant and, more importantly, the classification of loans 
as green is not based on commonly accepted standards. With this constraints in mind, 
we believe our analysis is nonetheless informative in that it provides some insights 
about the role of the banking sector in funding green activities. While the green bond 
market is playing an important role in financing green projects, a significant number 
of firms, particularly in Europe, does not have access to the bond market but relies 
mainly on the banking sector as a source of external funding. 
6.1. Data  
We use syndicated loans from DealScan.12 The data allows us to clearly identify the 
borrower and lenders at origination, as well as the main characteristics of the loan. To 
start with, we consider the sample of loans extended to European companies in the 
period 2007-2018.13 We retrieve 37,488 syndicated loans. We include only loans with 
full information on the size of the deal, the nationality of borrowers involved and some 
other basic deal characteristics. In a syndicated loan usually more than one bank 
provides funding. The lead arrangers set the terms of the deal and a preliminary 
agreement is signed. After the due diligence, the lead arrangers recruit other 
participant lenders to provide part of the funds. Finally, the loan contract is signed. To 
identify the lead bank in each loan, we follow previous literature (see, e.g. Ivachina 
2009, Acharya et al. 2017) and consider the definitions suggested by Standard & 
                                           
12 While syndicated lending is only a fraction of banks’ total lending, it is commonly used to evaluate bank 
lending policies and their impact on the real economy (e.g., Chodorow-Reich, 2013; Acharya et al., 2018). 
13 We consider companies located in the countries for which Eurostat provide greenhouse gas emission data, 
namely EU member states, EFTA countries and candidate countries.  
 Poor’s, which for the European loan market are ‘mandated lead arranger’, ‘mandated 
arranger’, or ‘bookrunner’. Having identified the lead lenders and the other deal 
participants, we use the information about the deal structure to fill in those loan shares 
that are missing.14 This procedure allows us to compute for each deal the lending 
amount of each bank. Then, we manually match the lenders in the sample of loans 
with the financial institutions issuing bonds. We are left with 34,852 loan contracts, 
corresponding to 222 unique banks. By merging these two datasets we can identify 
the banks that have issued green bonds and, at the same time, observe their pre- and 
post-issuance lending behavior. Accordingly, we define the dummy variable 
Green_issuer, which is equal to one from the time t when a bank that has issued a 
green bond onwards, and zero otherwise.                                                                 
As a measure of the ‘greenness’ of the activities against which we evaluate banks’ 
lending behavior, we use data on greenhouse gas – that is CO2 plus other air pollutants 
expressed in CO2 equivalent –emissions. Hence, de facto we focus on the climate 
change aspect of environmental-related issues. The data, obtained from Eurostat, 
contains information on greenhouse gas emissions at annual frequency, broken down 
by country and 64 industry (NACE Rev. 2 activity).15 We consider air emission 
intensities expressed as the ratio between greenhouse gasses and a measure of 
economic activity, expressed in terms of output or value added. Emission intensities 
are in kilograms per euro and larger values are associated with more polluting 
activities. We merge these data with the loan data using the information on the 
industry and the country of the borrower company. As a final step, for each bank, we 
aggregate the lending volumes extended to each industry-country pair in all periods.  
6.2. Econometric specification  
To investigate whether banks prefer to lend to less polluting industry-country pairs 
after the issuance of a green bond, we use the following regression: 
𝑌𝑌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺_𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆Emission_intensities𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡                                            +𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺_𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 ∗ Emission_intensities𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡, (2) 
The dependent variable (𝑌𝑌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡) is the total loan volume that industry j in country c 
attains from bank b in period t (expressed in logarithms).16 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺_𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺 is a dummy 
variable that equals one from the time t the bank b has issued a green bond onwards, 
and zero otherwise. Emission intensities is the ratio between greenhouse gasses and 
the output for a specific industry j in country c in period t. The parameter 𝜆𝜆 captures 
how the emission intensities of a specific industry-country affect the amount of lending. 
The parameter of interest, 𝛾𝛾, provides an indication of the lending activities of banks 
after having issued a green bond in relation to the pollution intensity. A negative 
                                           
14 Specifically, we follow the approach of Chodorow-Reich (2013). We take the average of the actual loan shares 
for lead and participant banks for all deals with the same syndicated structure (number of lead and 
participant banks). Then, we impute this information when the loan shares are missing to those loans with 
the same structure. 
15 To the best of our knowledge, this is the most disaggregated level to which green gasses emissions are 
available. Alternative dataset provide data at country level only (i.e. Germanwatch, Worldbank). 
16 Alternatively, we use as dependent variable an indicator for whether the lender serves as participant in the 
syndicated loan. Our specification is similar to the one proposed by Giannetti and Saidi (2017). 
 coefficient estimate would indicate that banks increase their lending towards those 
industry-country polluting less.  
The specification includes also a full battery of fixed effects defined by the pairwise 
interactions for  bank×industry, bank×country, and bank×year. The former two sets 
of fixed effects capture the specialization or proximity of a bank to a specific industry 
or country. The bank-year fixed effects saturate the regressions from other supply 
factors. We address concerns related to demand factors using industry×country, 
country×year and industry×year fixed effects. Our empirical strategy is similar to the 
one proposed by Giannetti and Saidi (2018). They investigate whether lenders provide 
larger loans to industries in distress using a specification at bank-industry-year level. 
We have a richer setup since we can exploit also variability at the country level. Thus, 
we can include a wider set of interaction terms to control for any factor that might lead 
to a spurious correlation between the interaction term and bank lending.  
Summary statistics of our main variables are displayed in Table 9. We limit the sample 
to bank-industry-country (bjc) with non-zero loans in at least two years. We end up 
with 35% of the observations are associated with positive loans. The variable green 
issuer is equal to one for only 15% of the observations (51 banks in our matched 
sample issued at least one green bond in the period 2007-2018). Emission intensities 
are on average equal to 0.63 Kg per euro, but with a significant variation across both 
industries and countries.   
 
--------------------INSERT TABLE 9 ---------------------------------- 
 
6.3. Results 
We report our main results in Table 10. Columns (1) and (2) refer to the full sample 
while in columns (3) and (4) we exclude domestic lending, defined as the lending of 
bank b to a borrower headquartered in the same country c of the lender. The models 
in odd-numbered columns include bank, industry, country and year fixed effects, while 
in the even-numbered columns we include the interaction fixed effects discussed 
above, which control for demand and supply confounding factors that might potentially 
threaten identification. The results for our baseline model with the (logs of) the loan 
size as the dependent variable are reported in panel A of Table 10. In all specifications, 
the negative coefficient estimated for the variable Emission_intensities suggests that 
larger emission intensities are associated with a lower amount of lending. Importantly, 
also the interaction term between Green_issuer and Emission_intensities is negative 
and statistically significant in all models.17 This means that an increase in emission 
intensities yields a relatively larger reduction of lending volumes by banks that have 
issued green bonds. While the nature of our data prevents us from drawing conclusions 
on the specific use of green bond proceeds to finance less polluting projects, we can 
nonetheless conclude that financial green bond issuers are committed to sustain less 
polluting activities. In terms of magnitude, the specification in column (2) implies that 
a one standard-deviation increase in the emission intensities yields a 10% reduction 
of lending volumes by banks active on the green bond market. The effect carries over 
                                           
17 In columns (2) and (4) the dummy Green_issuer drops due to multicollinearity. 
 when domestic loans are excluded from the sample (columns (3) and (4)). In panel B 
we use the average amount granted to industry j in country c by bank b, instead of 
total loan volumes, as our dependent variable. The results are not quantitatively 
different from those in panel A, suggesting that the effect in the baseline specification 
is not driven by a limited number of large deals. We further explore whether the 
negative impact of emissions on lending persists also at the extensive margin. In panel 
C the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if bank b 
has extended any loan to industry j in country c in period t, and zero otherwise. The 
interaction term between Green_issuer and Emission_intensities is still negative and 
statistically significant. Thus, not only the amount of the loans, but the very same 
decision to lend to sectors and countries with relatively high levels of greenhouse gas 
emissions change after the emission of a green bond. These findings suggest that, 
after having issued a green bond, banks lower their lending towards more polluting 
activities. These evidence complement previous results showing that firms with larger 
environmental risks have lower leverage level (Chang et al., 2018; Ginglinger and 
Moreau, 2019). 
 
--------------------INSERT TABLE 10 ---------------------------------- 
 
In Table 11 we provide additional robustness tests for our lending model. In panel A, 
we redefine the dependent variable so as to comprise the total amount granted by 
bank b independently of its role in the syndicate, i.e. when acting as a simple 
participant and not necessarily as the lead bank. The first two columns report the 
results for the full sample, with alternative sets of fixed effects. The results in columns 
(3) and (4) refer to the sub-sample of loan contracts extended to foreign borrowers. 
Interestingly, while our baseline results carry over for both samples with the set of 
bank, country, industry and year dummies, introducing interaction fixed effects makes 
the negative coefficient of our variable of interest statistically insignificant. This implies 
that banks do not change their overall lending decisions based on the degree of 
greenness of the borrowing sector after having issued a green bond. A reason for that 
might be found in the fact that banks participate in syndicated loans because of 
motivations other than the pure lending decision, for instance to establish or maintain 
a relationship with other syndicate members (Sufi, 2007). The result also suggests 
some caution in interpreting the results for the lead banks. In panel B, we replicate 
the baseline regression using a different definition of emission intensities computed as 
the ratio of gas emissions over value added. The results are in line with those in the 
baseline model. As an additional robustness check, in panel C we exclude public sector 
bodies and financial institutions from the pool of borrowers, as these sectors are 
commonly excluded in evaluating bank lending policies. In panel D we exclude loans 
granted to finance mergers and acquisitions. In this way we rule out the possibility 
that our results are only driven by borrowers in need of extra-funding. All the results 
are qualitatively similar to our baseline findings.  
Finally, in panel E we add as controls the variable Leverage defined as the median of 
the ratio of debt over total assets for industry j in country c and time t. In this way, 
we aim to capture any structural difference in the borrowing propensity which could be 
a confounding factor in our specification. We calculate the leverage using firm-level 
information from the Orbis dataset compiled by Bureau van Dijk. We first compute the 
 leverage ratio at the firm level using unconsolidated balance sheets, then we calculate 
the median value for each industry-country-time. The variable is statistically significant 
at 10% level in column 1 but loses significance when we add a more stringent series 
of fixed effects (column 2). Importantly, our main results are still confirmed.   
 




7. Conclusions  
Green bonds are a major market-based solution to channel funds into environment 
friendly activities and projects. While relatively new, the market is developing 
steadfastly. In this paper we investigate the pricing implications of the green label at 
issuance for non-governmental borrowers. Moreover, we test whether external review 
and repeat issuance have further impacts on equilibrium prices. We find that, after 
controlling for relevant characteristics of the debt instruments, green bonds issued by 
supranational institutions and non-financial corporates indeed benefit from a premium 
compared to ordinary bonds. This suggests that companies with high environmental 
performance benefit from a lower cost of debt. Furthermore, we find that certified 
green bonds benefit from a larger premium compared to self-labelled green bonds. 
This corroborates the prior that external review is indeed important in this emerging 
market. While we cannot explicitly elicit investors’ preferences for environment friendly 
investment from these findings, this is likely the channel at play in our setting. We test 
indirectly for the trust channel by checking whether there is a premium in favor of 
repeat issuers. Indeed, we find that repeat issuers benefit from an additional premium 
compared to one-time green borrowers, which we take as evidence of a reputation 
effect on the green bond market.  
While financial institutions issue a significant amount of green bonds, there is no 
evidence that they benefit from a pricing advantage with respect their ordinary bond 
instruments, ceteris paribus. We contend that this might be due to the inherent 
difficulties of linking directly the issuance of a bond with specific green projects. 
Motivated by the heterogeneity in the effect of the green label on securities issued by 
different types of corporate issuers, in the second part of the paper we investigate the 
lending behavior of banks after having issued debt on the green bond market. 
Specifically, we investigate whether financial institutions shift their syndicated lending 
towards less polluting activities after issuing a green bond. We find evidence that 
financial green bond issuers sustain less polluting activities, in that they reduce their 
lending to sectors with larger emission intensities. Thus, our analysis highlights that 
both sides of banks’ balance sheets are becoming to some extent greener. Ultimately, 
this implies a changed risk profile of banks’ balance sheets, particularly through the 
direct and indirect exposure to environmental and climate-related risks. While climate 
change is well recognised as a major challenge to financial stability and the global 
economy in international fora, such as G20 and the Financial Stability Board, it is still 
under discussion how micro- and macro-prudential supervision should account for 
these risks, particularly lower capital risk requirements for green assets. Such 
 regulatory changes would clearly have spillover effects on the green bond market. 
Future research might address these issues.   
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Figure 1 The Green Bond Market. The figure reports 
the total amount of Green Bonds issued (blue bars) 
yearly, billions of Euros. The red line represents the 
number of green bonds issued from 2007 until end of 





Figure 2 Green Bond market breakdown by issuer 
type. The figure shows the green bond market 
composition by issuer type. The data source is Dealogic 
DCM. 
  
 Tables  
 
Table 1 Type of bonds. The table shows the numbers of bonds (tranches), the amount (in billions 
of euro), and the average yield at issue (in basis point) by type of issuer. Panel A compares green 
and ordinary bonds. Panel B compares CBI and Non-CBI bonds. A bond is classified as green if it 
reported as such in DCM, ordinary otherwise. A bond is classified as CBI if the bond notes include 
information regarding the second party providing the external review. 
Panel A.             
Issuer  Green Ordinary 
 




institutions 228 44.44 3.52 7478 1430.80 5.19 
Financial firms 538 145.55 3.02 169061 23961.65 3.18 
Non financial firms 631 124.36 3.62 93376 19587.93 4.73 
Total  1397 314.36 3.37 269915 44980.38 3.77 
              
Panel B.             
Issuer  Certified Non-Certified 
 




institutions 84 14 4.27 144 31 3.09 
Financial firms 250 66 2.92 288 79 3.11 
Non financial firms 303 67 3.04 328 57 4.15 












 Table 2 Summary statistics. The table shows the summary statistics for the 
overall sample. Yield is the bond yield at issue (in basis point). Green is a dummy 
variable equal to one if a bond is classified as green. External review is a dummy 
variable equal to one if a green bond has a second party opinion or is CBI-
certified, zero otherwise. Callable is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is 
callable by issuer, Puttable is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is 
puttable by issuer, Collateralized is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is 
backed by a collateral, Amount is the amount of the tranche in millions of euros, 
years to maturity is the number of years of the bond to maturity, rating is a 
categorical variable indicating with low values top ratings (i.e. AAA) and high 
values lower ratings (i.e. BBB-) or no ratings.  
 N Mean Median St. Dev. P. 1 P. 99 
Yield 271312 3.7702 3.3700 2.5090 0.0500 12.0900 
Green 271312 0.0051 0.0000 0.0716 0.0000 0.0000 
External review 271312 0.0007 0.0000 0.0266 0.0000 0.0000 
Callable 271312 0.3715 0.0000 0.4832 0.0000 1.0000 
Puttable 271312 0.0687 0.0000 0.2529 0.0000 1.0000 
Collateralized 271312 0.1656 0.0000 0.3718 0.0000 1.0000 
Amount (Ml€) 271312 166.94 45.2580 353.42 0.6861 1630.21 
Years to Maturity 271312 7.5556 5.0000 7.6287 0.5000 39.8300 






Table 3 Offering yield regression. The table presents the OLS regression results of offering yield on the green 
bond indicator.  The dependent variable is the bond yield at issue. Green is a dummy variable equal to one if a 
bond is classified as green. All specifications include a set of bond fixed effects. Callable is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the bond is callable by issuer, Puttable is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is puttable 
by issuer, Collateralized is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is backed by a collateral, , Use of 
proceeds is a categorical variable capturing the purpose of the issuance refinancing, general corporate purpose, 
securitization and others (which is the baseline), Bond size category is a categorical variable based on the 
decile of the bond amount, Issue size category is a categorical variable based on the decile of the bonds issued 
by that issuer on that day, Currency refers to the currency of the bond, Maturity is a categorical variable based 
on the maturity of the bond (0-5 y, 5-10y, and >10y), Rating is a categorical variable based on the agencies’ 
ratings with 1 assigned to the top rating and 11 to the worst rating (or no rated), Time is time (month) fixed 
effect, Maturity×Rating×Time is the interaction term, Issuer is the fixed effect for the company issuing the 
bond. Robust standard errors, clustered at issuer level, are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Supranational Financial Non-financial 
     
Green -0.2866 -0.8046*** 0.1001 -0.2156** 
 (0.178) (0.149) (0.312) (0.108) 
Callable 0.2518*** -0.4640*** 0.2741*** 0.2253*** 
 (0.083) (0.106) (0.100) (0.034) 
Puttable 0.1207*** 0.0861 -0.0548 0.0542* 
 (0.044) (0.219) (0.158) (0.030) 
Collateralized 0.3298***  0.2949*** 0.0766 
 (0.065)  (0.074) (0.075) 
Use of proceeds     
General Corporate Purposes 0.0294 0.2241 0.0353 0.1233*** 
 (0.051) (0.288) (0.085) (0.044) 
Securitisation -0.3633***  -0.0801 -0.6990*** 
 (0.140)  (0.147) (0.142) 
Refinancing -0.0435 0.0386 0.1770* -0.0892** 
 (0.048) (0.664) (0.099) (0.044) 
     
Constant 3.5876*** 5.0464*** 2.9697*** 4.5865*** 
 (0.057) (0.282) (0.092) (0.044) 
     
Observations 266,724 7,391 168,594 89,902 
R-squared 0.7296 0.4767 0.7176 0.8056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.714 0.436 0.707 0.775 
     
Bond size cat FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issue size cat FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Maturity×Rating×Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issuer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
  
 Table 4 Offering yield regression. The table presents the OLS regression results of offering yield on the green 
bond indicator.  The dependent variable is the bond yield at issue. Green is a dummy variable equal to one if a 
bond is classified as green. External review is a dummy variable equal to one if a green bond has second party 
opinion or is certified by the Climate Bond Initiative, zero otherwise. All specifications include a set of bond fixed 
effects. Callable is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is callable by issuer, Puttable is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the bond is puttable by issuer, Collateralized is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is 
backed by a collateral, , Use of proceeds is a categorical variable capturing the purpose of the issuance 
refinancing, general corporate purpose, securitization and others (which is the baseline), Bond size category 
is a categorical variable based on the decile of the bond amount, Issue size category is a categorical variable 
based on the decile of the bonds issued by that issuer on that day, Currency refers to the currency of the bond, 
Maturity is a categorical variable based on the maturity of the bond (0-5 y, 5-10y, and >10y), Rating is a 
categorical variable based on the agencies’ ratings with 1 assigned to the top rating and 11 to the worst rating 
(or no rated), Time is time (month) fixed effect, Maturity×Rating×Time is their interaction, Issuer is the 
fixed effect for the company issuing the bond. Robust standard errors, clustered at issuer level, are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Supranational Financial Non-financial 
     
Green -0.3037 -1.0255*** 0.0456 -0.0049 
 (0.232) (0.102) (0.198) (0.143) 
External review 0.0380 0.5740 0.1137 -0.4374** 
 (0.278) (0.496) (0.339) (0.179) 
Callable 0.2518*** -0.4643*** 0.2741*** 0.2252*** 
 (0.083) (0.106) (0.100) (0.034) 
Puttable 0.1207*** 0.0892 -0.0548 0.0539* 
 (0.044) (0.219) (0.158) (0.030) 
Collateralized 0.3298***  0.2949*** 0.0761 
 (0.065)  (0.074) (0.075) 
Use of proceeds:     
General Corporate Purposes 0.0294 0.2124 0.0356 0.1237*** 
 (0.051) (0.278) (0.085) (0.044) 
Securitisation -0.3633***  -0.0797 -0.6997*** 
 (0.140)  (0.147) (0.142) 
Refinancing -0.0435 0.0081 0.1773* -0.0884** 
 (0.048) (0.665) (0.099) (0.044) 
Constant 3.5876*** 5.0582*** 2.9694*** 4.5862*** 
 (0.057) (0.270) (0.093) (0.044) 
     
Observations 266,724 7,391 168,594 89,902 
R-squared 0.7296 0.4769 0.7176 0.8056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.714 0.436 0.707 0.775 
     
Bond size cat FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issue size cat FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Maturity×Rating×Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issuer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
  
 Table 5 Offering yield regression. The table presents the OLS regression results of offering yield on the green bond indicator.  
The dependent variable is the bond yield at issue. Green is a dummy variable equal to one if a bond is classified as green. 
Experienced green is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is not issuing a green bond for the first time, zero otherwise. 
All specifications include a set of bond fixed effects. Callable is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is callable by issuer, 
Puttable is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is puttable by issuer, Collateralized is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the bond is backed by a collateral, , Use of proceeds is a categorical variable capturing the purpose of the issuance refinancing, 
general corporate purpose, securitization and others (which is the baseline), Bond size category is a categorical variable based 
on the decile of the bond amount, Issue size category is a categorical variable based on the decile of the bonds issued by that 
issuer on that day, Currency refers to the currency of the bond, Maturity is a categorical variable based on the maturity of the 
bond (0-5 y, 5-10y, and >10y), Rating is a categorical variable based on the agencies’ ratings with 1 assigned to the top rating 
and 11 to the worst rating (or no rated), Time is time (month) fixed effect, Maturity×Rating×Time is their interaction, Issuer 
is the fixed effect for the company issuing the bond. Robust standard errors, clustered at issuer level, are in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Supranational Financial Non-financial 
     
Green -0.0285 -1.3087* -0.1062 -0.0808 
 (0.108) (0.722) (0.122) (0.126) 
Experienced green -0.4415* 0.5180 0.3679 -0.3501** 
 (0.240) (0.765) (0.410) (0.147) 
Callable 0.2518*** -0.4639*** 0.2741*** 0.2260*** 
 (0.083) (0.106) (0.100) (0.034) 
Puttable 0.1205*** 0.0867 -0.0544 0.0542* 
 (0.044) (0.218) (0.158) (0.030) 
Collateralized 0.3293***  0.2955*** 0.0770 
 (0.065)  (0.073) (0.075) 
Use of proceeds:     
General Corporate Purposes 0.0290 0.2265 0.0359 0.1235*** 
 (0.051) (0.288) (0.085) (0.044) 
Securitisation -0.3634***  -0.0797 -0.6985*** 
 (0.140)  (0.147) (0.142) 
Refinancing -0.0433 0.0362 0.1780* -0.0887** 
 (0.048) (0.665) (0.099) (0.044) 
     
Constant 3.5878*** 5.0442*** 2.9690*** 4.5858*** 
 (0.057) (0.282) (0.093) (0.044) 
     
Observations 266,724 7,391 168,594 89,902 
R-squared 0.7296 0.4767 0.7176 0.8056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.714 0.435 0.707 0.775 
     
Bond size cat FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issue size cat FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Maturity×Rating×Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issuer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
  
 Table 6 Offering yield: robustness I. The table presents the OLS regression results of offering yield on the 
green bond indicator.  . The dependent variable is the bond yield at issue. Green is a dummy variable equal to 
one if a bond is classified as green. All specifications include a set of bond fixed effects. Callable is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the bond is callable by issuer, Puttable is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is 
puttable by issuer, Collateralized is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is backed by a collateral, Use 
of proceeds is a categorical variable capturing the purpose of the issuance refinancing, general corporate 
purpose, securitization and others (which is the baseline), Bond size category is a categorical variable based 
on the decile of the bond amount, Issue size category is a categorical variable based on the decile of the bonds 
issued by that issuer on that day, Currency refers to the currency of the bond, Maturity is a categorical variable 
based on the maturity of the bond (0-5 y, 5-10y, and >10y), Rating is a categorical variable based on the 
agencies’ ratings with 1 assigned to the top rating and 11 to the worst rating (or not rated), Time is time (month) 
fixed effect, Maturity×Rating×Time is their interaction, Issuer is the fixed effect for the company issuing the 
bond. In panel A we distinguish between developed and emerging countries. In panel B the model includes an 
additional control Local which is a dummy variable if the bond is denominated in local currency. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at issuer level, are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Panel A. Developing vs emerging countries     





















         
Green -0.4788** 0.2061* -0.7794*** -1.3167*** -0.0209 0.0943 -0.4228*** 0.1552 
 (0.235) (0.119) (0.181) (0.119) (0.485) (0.139) (0.132) (0.106) 
Callable 0.2382** 0.3964*** -0.5040*** -0.0513 0.2665** 0.2909*** 0.2136*** 0.2286*** 
 (0.095) (0.059) (0.097) (0.196) (0.106) (0.106) (0.039) (0.059) 
Puttable 0.2380*** 0.0717** 0.0991  -0.3134 -0.0027 0.1831*** 0.0694** 
 (0.082) (0.036) (0.234)  (0.273) (0.092) (0.047) (0.034) 
Collateralized 0.2838*** 0.1371   0.1655** 0.3467*** 0.1805** -0.0481 
 (0.079) (0.085)   (0.079) (0.115) (0.078) (0.108) 
Use of proceeds: 
         
General Corporate 
Purposes -0.1305* 0.1732*** 0.2512 -0.7347 0.0527 -0.4621*** -0.1749*** 0.3879*** 
 (0.068) (0.050) (0.301) (0.611) (0.101) (0.110) (0.062) (0.052) 
Securitisation -0.4481*** 0.3565**   0.0599 -0.4048* -1.1170*** 0.4886* 
 (0.151) (0.161)   (0.157) (0.220) (0.149) (0.261) 
Refinancing -0.0740 -0.1699*** -0.4428 1.0423 0.1507 -0.2482* -0.1951*** -0.0324 
 (0.061) (0.045) (0.301) (0.779) (0.111) (0.144) (0.057) (0.044) 
Constant 3.2692*** 5.5269*** 5.1078*** 5.3832*** 2.7424*** 5.6020*** 4.0613*** 5.6801*** 
 (0.077) (0.044) (0.294) (0.612) (0.111) (0.102) (0.064) (0.042) 
         
Observations 216,769 48,992 6,490 780 152,529 15,146 56,978 32,073 
R-squared 0.6767 0.7945 0.4816 0.6352 0.6647 0.8634 0.8145 0.7808 
Adjusted R-squared 0.662 0.760 0.438 0.449 0.653 0.839 0.783 0.740 
         
Bond size cat FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issue size cat FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Maturity×Rating×Tim
e FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issuer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Panel B. Local Currency     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Supranational Financial Non-financial 
     
Green -0.2832 -0.8008*** 0.0994 -0.2136** 
 (0.176) (0.153) (0.312) (0.108) 
Local -0.1854* -0.1278 0.0315 -0.1224 
 (0.104) (0.207) (0.092) (0.093) 
Callable 0.2525*** -0.4705*** 0.2738*** 0.2245*** 
 (0.083) (0.105) (0.100) (0.034) 
Puttable 0.1131*** 0.1287 -0.0540 0.0517* 
 (0.044) (0.198) (0.157) (0.030) 
Collateralized 0.3295***  0.2948*** 0.0716 
 (0.064)  (0.074) (0.075) 
Use of proceeds:     
General Corporate Purposes 0.0201 0.2292 0.0378 0.1205*** 
 (0.049) (0.291) (0.083) (0.043) 
Securitisation -0.3713***  -0.0790 -0.7016*** 
  (0.140)  (0.147) (0.142) 
Refinancing -0.0465 0.0715 0.1768* -0.0902** 
     
Constant 3.7427*** 5.0598*** 2.9423*** 4.6906*** 
 (0.101) (0.269) (0.103) (0.084) 
     
Observations 266,724 7,391 168,594 89,902 
R-squared 0.7299 0.4768 0.7176 0.8057 
Adjusted R-squared 0.714 0.436 0.707 0.775 
     
Bond size cat FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issue size cat FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Maturity×Rating×Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issuer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
 Table 7 Yield spread: robustness II OECD countries. The table presents OLS regression results of yield 
spread and offering yield spread for the sub-sample of issuers located in OECD countries. and The dependent 
variable is the yield spread (columns (1) and (2)), measured as the difference between the bond yield at issuance 
and a similar Treasury bond issued by the same country and comparable maturity, and the bond yield at issue 
(columns (3) and (4)). Green is a dummy variable equal to one if a bond is classified as green. All specifications 
include a set of bond fixed effects. Callable is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is callable by issuer, 
Puttable is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is puttable by issuer, Collateralized is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the bond is backed by a collateral, Use of proceeds is a categorical variable capturing the purpose 
of the issuance refinancing, general corporate purpose, securitization and others (which is the baseline), Bond 
size category is a categorical variable based on the decile of the bond amount, Issue size category is a 
categorical variable based on the decile of the bonds issued by that issuer on that day, Currency refers to the 
currency of the bond,. Maturity is a categorical variable based on the maturity of the bond (0-5 y, 5-10y, and 
>10y), Rating is a categorical variable based on the agencies’ ratings with 1 assigned to the top rating and 11 
to the worst rating (or not rated), Time is time (month) fixed effect, Maturity×Rating×Time is their interaction, 
Issuer is the fixed effect for the company issuing the bond. Robust standard errors, clustered at issuer level, 
are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Yield spread  Offering yield 
      
VARIABLES Financial Non-financial  Financial Non-financial 
      
Green 0.3179 -0.3413**  -0.0596 -0.5750*** 
 (0.437) (0.157)  (0.474) (0.104) 
Callable 0.3525*** 0.2298***  0.3212*** 0.1696*** 
 (0.071) (0.047)  (0.068) (0.041) 
Puttable 0.3075 0.2332***  0.3621* 0.1737*** 
 (0.257) (0.054)  (0.202) (0.046) 
Collateralized 0.2314*** 0.1075  0.1517** 0.0730 
 (0.077) (0.076)  (0.067) (0.071) 
Use of proceeds:      
General Corporate Purposes 0.2396 -0.2596***  0.0661 -0.3342*** 
 (0.160) (0.067)  (0.146) (0.061) 
Securitisation 0.1987 -1.2612***  0.2287 -1.3358*** 
 (0.195) (0.159)  (0.206) (0.145) 
Refinancing 0.4454* -0.3448***  0.1475 -0.3662*** 
 (0.229) (0.052)  (0.213) (0.049) 
    2.6036*** 4.2728*** 
Constant 0.3685** 2.5186***  (0.149) (0.061) 
 (0.164) (0.063)    
      
Observations 116,105 34,673  135,552 43,339 
R-squared 0.4980 0.7210  0.6769 0.8165 
Adjusted R-squared 0.477 0.651  0.664 0.776 
      
Bond size cat FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Issue size cat FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Currency FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Maturity×Rating×Time FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Issuer FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
  
 Table 8 Offering yield: financial institutions. The table presents the OLS regression results of offering yield 
on the green bond indicator for the sub-sample of financial institutions. The dependent variable is the bond yield 
at issue. Green is a dummy variable equal to one if a bond is classified as green. Environmentally friendly is 
a dummy variable equal to one from the year onward in which a bank signed the United Nations Environment 
Programme Finance Initiative. All specifications include a set of bond fixed effects. Callable is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the bond is callable by issuer, Puttable is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is puttable 
by issuer, Collateralized is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond is backed by a collateral, Use of proceeds 
is a categorical variable capturing the purpose of the issuance refinancing, general corporate purpose, 
securitization and others (which is the baseline), Bond size category is a categorical variable based on the 
decile of the bond amount, Issue size category is a categorical variable based on the decile of the bonds issued 
by that issuer on that day, Currency refers to the currency of the bond. Maturity is a categorical variable based 
on the maturity of the bond (0-5 y, 5-10y, and >10y), Rating is a categorical variable based on the agencies’ 
ratings with 1 assigned to the top rating and 11 to the worst rating (or no rated), Time is time (month) fixed 
effect, Maturity×Rating×Time is their interaction, Issuer is the fixed effect for the company issuing the bond. 






Environmentally friendly  0.1696 
 (0.217) 









Use of proceeds:  











Adjusted R-squared 0.707 
  
Bond size cat FE Yes 
Issue size cat FE Yes 
Currency FE Yes 
Maturity×Rating×Time FE Yes 




 Table 9. Green issuer and lending decisions. The table shows the summary statistics for the sample of bank 
lending. The unit of observation is the bank-country-industry-year level, based on the sample of all completed 
syndicated loans from 2007 to 2018 granted to industry-country (jc) for which bank b served as lead arranger 
in year t. The sample is limited to bank-industry-country (bjc) with non-zero loans in at least two years. Amount 
is the logarithm of the total amount granted to industry-country (jc) for which bank b served as lead arranger in 
year t, plus one. Average amount is the logarithm of the average amount granted to industry-country (jc) for 
which bank b served as lead arranger in year t, plus one. Any loan is a dummy variable which takes value one 
if any loans were granted to industry-country jc by bank b in period t, zero otherwise. Green issuer is a dummy 
variable which takes value one from the time t the bank b has issued a green bond onwards, zero otherwise. 
Emission intensities is the ratio between greenhouse gasses and the output for a specific industry j in country 
c in period t. Emission intensities 2 is the ratio between greenhouse gasses and the value added for a specific 
industry j in country c in period t. The unit of measure is kilograms per Euro. 
 
 N Mean Median St. Dev. P. 1 P. 99 
Amount 69180 3.3092 0.0000 4.4904 0.0000 11.8679 
Average amount 69180 3.0225 0.0000 4.1017 0.0000 10.9739 
Any loan 69180 0.3589 0.0000 0.4797 0.0000 1.0000 
Green issuer 69180 0.1504 0.0000 0.3575 0.0000 1.0000 
Emission intensities 65455 0.6381 0.0498 1.5643 0.0000 7.6062 
Emission intensities 2 65380 0.2074 0.0231 0.4905 0.0000 2.6389 
 
  
 Table 10. Green issuer and lending decisions. The table presents the OLS regression results of lending 
decisions on green issuers varying by emission intensities. The unit of observation is the bank-country-industry-
year level, based on the sample of all completed syndicated loans from 2007 to 2018 granted to industry-country 
(jc) for which bank b served as lead arranger in year t. The sample is limited to bank-industry-country (bjc) with 
non-zero loans in at least two years. In all panels, models 1-2 include all observations independently on the 
country, while models 3-4 we limited the sample of those observations for which the borrower country is different 
from the bank country. In models 1 and 3 we control for bank, country, NACE and year fixed effects. In models 
2 and 4 we control for bank-NACE, bank-country, bank-year, country-year, country-NACE and NACE-year fixed 
effects. In panel A the dependent is the total amount in log plus one. In panel B the dependent variable is the 
average size of loans granted to industry-country jc by bank b in period t. In panel C the dependent variable is 
a dummy variable which takes value one if any loans were granted to industry-industry jc by bank b in period t, 
zero otherwise. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 All  Excluding domestic 
Panel A: Amount     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Green issuer 0.2958  0.3793*  
 (0.186)  (0.205)  
Emission intensities -0.0714** -0.1105* -0.0842*** -0.0189 
 (0.028) (0.061) (0.029) (0.056) 
Green issuer* Emission intensities -0.1254*** -0.0686** -0.1383*** -0.1846*** 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.038) (0.032) 
     
Observations 65,021 64,715 49,875 49,470 
R-squared 0.1118 0.3367 0.1093 0.2693 
Adjusted R-squared 0.108 0.266 0.105 0.196 
Bank FE Yes No Yes No 
Country FE Yes No Yes No 
NACE FE Yes No Yes No 
Year FE Yes No Yes No 
Bank-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Country FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 
NACE-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Panel B: Average     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Green issuer 0.2575  0.3385*  
 (0.165)  (0.184)  
Emission intensities -0.0691*** -0.1112* -0.0797*** -0.1778*** 
 (0.025) (0.056) (0.028) (0.063) 
Green issuer* Emission intensities -0.1083*** -0.0647** -0.1227*** -0.0892** 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.034) (0.036) 
     
Observations 65,021 64,715 49,875 49,457 
R-squared 0.1020 0.3100 0.1019 0.2979 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0985 0.237 0.0976 0.216 
Bank FE Yes No Yes No 
Country FE Yes No Yes No 
NACE FE Yes No Yes No 
Year FE Yes No Yes No 
Bank-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Country FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 
NACE-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Panel C: Any loan     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Green issuer 0.0292  0.0398*  
 (0.019)  (0.021)  
Emission intensities -0.0055** -0.0102 -0.0066** -0.0179** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
Green issuer* Emission intensities -0.0128*** -0.0077** -0.0144*** -0.0103** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Observations 65,021 64,715 49,875 49,457 
R-squared 0.0982 0.3059 0.0966 0.2898 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.0946 0.232 0.0923 0.207 
Bank FE Yes No Yes No 
Country FE Yes No Yes No 
NACE FE Yes No Yes No 
Year FE Yes No Yes No 
Bank-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Country FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 




Table 11. Green issuer and lending decisions: robustness. The table presents the OLS regression results 
of lending decisions on green issuers varying by emission intensities. The unit of observation is the bank-country-
industry-year level, based on the sample of all completed syndicated loans from 2007 to 2018 granted to 
industry-country (jc) for which bank b served as lead arranger in year t. The sample is limited to bank-industry-
country (bjc) with non-zero loans in at least two years. In all panels, models 1-2 include all observations 
independently on the country, while models 3-4 we limited the sample of those observations for which the 
borrower country is different from the bank country. In models 1 and 3 we control for bank, country, NACE and 
year fixed effects. In models 2 and 4 we control for bank-NACE, bank-country, bank-year, country-year, country-
NACE and NACE-year fixed effects. In panel A the dependent variable is the total amount granted to industry-
country jc by bank b, independently on the role in the deal in period t. In panel B emission intensities2 is the 
ratio between green gasses and value added. In panel C we drop observations for public-service and financial 
services industries (respectively NACE O and F). In panel D we exclude in the initial sample those loans classified 
in term of main purpose as “LBO”, “MBO”, “Merger”, “Project financing” or “Takeover”. In panel E Leverage is 
the median ratio between debt and total assets for industry-country jc at time t. Robust standard errors, clustered 
at the bank level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
All Excluding domestic 
Panel A: Any role 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Green issuer 0.2585 0.3296* 
(0.168) (0.185) 
Emission intensities -0.0524** 0.0030 -0.0604** -0.0394 
(0.021) (0.048) (0.024) (0.047) 
Green issuer* Emission intensities -0.1133*** -0.0233 -0.1221*** -0.0449 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.034) (0.030) 
Observations 85,751 85,594 67,640 67,434 
R-squared 0.1014 0.3391 0.0996 0.3168 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0983 0.274 0.0960 0.244 
Bank FE Yes No Yes No 
Country FE Yes No Yes No 
NACE FE Yes No Yes No 
Year FE Yes No Yes No 
Bank-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Country FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 
NACE-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Panel B: Different Emission intensities definition 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Green issuer 0.2873 0.3654* 
(0.186) (0.205) 
Emission intensities2 -0.1853* -1.2575*** -0.2513*** -1.5160*** 
(0.102) (0.281) (0.096) (0.320) 
Green issuer* Emission intensities2 -0.3264*** -0.1829* -0.3327*** -0.2006* 
(0.098) (0.095) (0.124) (0.116) 
Observations 64,949 64,635 49,815 49,397 
R-squared 0.1118 0.3368 0.1093 0.3159 
Adjusted R-squared 0.108 0.267 0.105 0.236 
Bank FE Yes No Yes No 
Country FE Yes No Yes No 
NACE FE Yes No Yes No 
Year FE Yes No Yes No 
Bank-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Country FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 
NACE-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Panel C: Excluding public-service and financial services industries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Green issuer 0.2901 0.3734* 
(0.189) (0.210) 
Emission intensities -0.0711** -0.1014* -0.0861*** -0.1808*** 
(0.028) (0.060) (0.030) (0.067) 
Green issuer* Emission intensities -0.1304*** -0.0675** -0.1422*** -0.0922** 
(0.031) (0.034) (0.039) (0.040) 
      
Observations 62,310 62,007 47,901 47,482 
R-squared 0.1147 0.3396 0.1130 0.3207 
Adjusted R-squared 0.111 0.268 0.109 0.240 
Bank FE Yes No Yes No 
Country FE Yes No Yes No 
NACE FE Yes No Yes No 
Year FE Yes No Yes No 
Bank-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Country FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 
NACE-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Panel D: Excluding M&A loans     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Green issuer 0.2557  0.3318*  
 (0.173)  (0.193)  
Emission intensities -0.0785*** -0.0321 -0.0781** -0.0641 
 (0.030) (0.059) (0.031) (0.073) 
Green issuer* Emission intensities -0.1159*** -0.0873** -0.1313*** -0.1088** 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.040) (0.045) 
     
Observations 58,546 58,222 44,774 44,402 
R-squared 0.1201 0.3413 0.1195 0.3257 
Adjusted R-squared 0.116 0.268 0.115 0.241 
Bank FE Yes No Yes No 
Country FE Yes No Yes No 
NACE FE Yes No Yes No 
Year FE Yes No Yes No 
Bank-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Country FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 
NACE-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Panel E: Additional control (Leverage)     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Green issuer 0.2940  0.3785*  
 (0.186)  (0.205)  
Emission intensities -0.0700** -0.1093* -0.0836*** -0.1917*** 
 (0.028) (0.061) (0.029) (0.068) 
Green issuer* Emission intensities -0.1249*** -0.0684** -0.1376*** -0.0954** 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.038) (0.040) 
Leverage 0.2602* 0.1288 0.1545 -0.1077 
 (0.150) (0.202) (0.165) (0.247) 
     
Observations 64,970 64,664 49,839 49,421 
R-squared 0.1117 0.3367 0.1091 0.3156 
Adjusted R-squared 0.108 0.266 0.105 0.236 
Bank FE Yes No Yes No 
Country FE Yes No Yes No 
NACE FE Yes No Yes No 
Year FE Yes No Yes No 
Bank-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Country FE No Yes No Yes 
Bank-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes 
Country-NACE FE No Yes No Yes 




Table 12. Emission intensities by country: summary statistics. Summary statistics of emission intensities 
defined as green gasses emissions in Kg. over output by country.  
Country Mean St. Dev. P. 1 P. 99 
AT 0.6270 0.9222 0.0009 3.6320 
BE 0.6079 1.0456 0.0037 3.7926 
BG 1.0071 2.8863 0.0009 10.2058 
CH 0.1257 0.3208 0.0039 1.6933 
CY 0.6726 1.7162 0.0023 10.2058 
CZ 1.5666 3.2685 0.0061 10.0129 
DE 0.7360 1.6902 0.0038 7.2590 
DK 0.6697 1.9471 0.0036 10.2058 
EE 2.6934 4.5003 0.0044 10.2058 
ES 0.6155 1.2256 0.0005 5.0946 
FI 0.8161 1.6356 0.0001 6.4097 
FR 0.3587 0.8800 0.0018 3.2734 
GB 0.6189 1.5491 0.0000 7.8811 
GR 0.6964 1.9290 0.0001 10.2058 
HR 0.7028 1.2967 0.0025 6.3143 
HU 2.0642 2.6062 0.0570 8.5625 
IE 0.6643 1.6740 0.0008 8.3937 
IS 0.1088 0.5068 0.0021 3.8774 
IT 0.6135 1.4152 0.0006 5.9694 
LT 0.9903 1.7181 0.0042 4.9588 
LU 0.0916 0.4246 0.0000 0.4735 
LV 0.2528 0.9458 0.0050 4.5547 
MT 0.0040 0.0007 0.0035 0.0058 
NL 0.7153 1.6767 0.0052 7.9187 
NO 0.4591 0.8339 0.0000 3.2592 
PL 2.0241 3.1831 0.0180 10.2058 
PT 1.2786 2.0778 0.0007 7.5096 
RO 1.9389 2.6136 0.0155 10.2058 
RS 0.0592 0.0712 0.0209 0.4516 
SE 0.4153 1.0227 0.0018 5.7084 
SI 0.3807 1.3905 0.0000 7.7436 
SK 1.9644 2.8958 0.0166 10.2058 
TR 1.2407 2.9056 0.0000 10.2058 
Table 13. Emission intensities by industry: summary statistics. Summary statistics of emission intensities 
defined as green gasses emissions in Kg. over output by industry. We use the most level of disaggregation 
provided by Eurostat. 
NACE Mean St. Dev. P. 1 P. 99 
A01 3.5204 1.8384 1.0954 10.2058 
A02 0.1383 0.1067 0.0000 0.3409 
A03 0.8574 0.7325 0.0062 2.5022 
B 1.0250 1.1623 0.0946 4.9845 
C10-C12 0.2217 0.0955 0.0706 0.4079 
C13-C15 0.1829 0.0956 0.0272 0.4735 
C16 0.2053 0.1900 0.0319 0.8748 
C17 0.7081 0.3909 0.2334 1.6025 
C18 0.0793 0.0122 0.0509 0.1044 
C19 5.4094 2.5729 0.0000 10.2058 
C20 1.2256 0.8808 0.1205 4.8446 
C21 0.0938 0.2201 0.0034 1.1546 
C22 0.1048 0.0741 0.0071 0.3363 
C23 2.9758 1.2131 1.2865 5.6611 
C24 2.9791 1.8262 0.2163 9.6014 
C25 0.0687 0.0610 0.0269 0.1994 
C26 0.0227 0.0163 0.0001 0.0629 
C27 0.0615 0.0404 0.0000 0.1663 
C28 0.0484 0.0335 0.0030 0.1587 
C29 0.0743 0.0483 0.0146 0.2196 
C30 0.0479 0.0263 0.0070 0.1137 
C31-C32 0.0614 0.0474 0.0041 0.1818 
D 4.9411 3.0569 0.0139 10.2058 
E36 0.1812 0.1955 0.0000 0.8361 
E37-E39 2.0385 0.8404 0.6190 3.5266 
F 0.1100 0.1175 0.0069 0.6558 
G45 0.0787 0.0752 0.0089 0.4571 
G46 0.0563 0.0434 0.0000 0.2299 
G47 0.0510 0.0312 0.0019 0.1619 
H49 0.6645 0.3490 0.2378 1.8374 
H50 2.9121 2.2654 0.1980 10.2058 
H51 4.2839 1.3176 0.0530 6.8690 
H52 0.0765 0.0833 0.0001 0.2529 
H53 0.0896 0.0525 0.0115 0.2411 
I 0.0587 0.0276 0.0097 0.1214 
J58 0.0181 0.0179 0.0014 0.0767 
J59-J60 0.0162 0.0077 0.0036 0.0300 
J61 0.0146 0.0155 0.0000 0.0968 
J62-J63 0.0116 0.0084 0.0032 0.0320 
K64 0.0127 0.0194 0.0001 0.1058 
K65 0.0061 0.0068 0.0000 0.0238 
K66 0.0084 0.0097 0.0000 0.0400 
L 0.0087 0.0157 0.0004 0.0728 
M69-M70 0.0111 0.0074 0.0000 0.0431 
M71 0.0164 0.0090 0.0000 0.0564 
M73 0.0169 0.0073 0.0069 0.0346 
M74-M75 0.0453 0.2482 0.0000 0.4239 
N77 0.0806 0.1044 0.0016 0.7578 
N78 0.0162 0.0260 0.0000 0.1066 
N79 0.0237 0.0431 0.0000 0.2037 
N80-N82 0.0351 0.0258 0.0000 0.0906 
O 0.0371 0.0225 0.0023 0.1082 
P 0.0248 0.0118 0.0005 0.0504 
Q86 0.0267 0.0166 0.0018 0.0857 
Q87-Q88 0.0407 0.0132 0.0114 0.0684 
R90-R92 0.0334 0.0276 0.0061 0.1039 
R93 0.0959 0.0640 0.0185 0.3249 
S94 0.0722 0.0578 0.0169 0.2136 
S95 0.0413 0.0036 0.0343 0.0484 














GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
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Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: http://europa.eu 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe 
Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact). 
doi:10.2760/496913 
ISBN 978-92-76-02042-4 
K
J-A
E-1
9
-0
0
7
-EN
-N
